Essay I wrote about perception, re: John Locke

This difficulty concerning Locke's theory of ideas indicates, according to R I Aaron, 

"that he felt uneasy about its implications,”(1)

and the fact that Locke devoted three sections at the beginning of this chapter to expressing this objection can be seen as a measure of the extent of this uneasiness. Indeed, the problem of relating ideas and the existence of external objects, posed a threat to the fundamental character of Locke's theory and exposed assumptions he had made in the Essay, which perhaps should have been defended. Most importantly, in seeking to escape the subjectivist and sceptical implications of his theory, as exemplified in this objection, Locke ironically undermined his fundamental aim - that of determining what can and what cannot be comprehended, through examination of the instrument of human understanding and its limitations.  He did this by attempting to venture beyond what was by his own definition comprehensible. 

  When considering the relationship between ideas and actually existent objects, the first problem is in determining the nature of the relation which Locke is trying trying to prove; that is, what is meant by saying that they ‘agree’? D.J. O’Connor, in a chapter on “The Reality Of Ideas” argues that 

 “The use of the words ‘conformity’ and ‘agree’ in this passage suggest that there is some sort of standard relation between our ideas and the state of affairs that they represent in virtue of which our ideas give us knowledge about the world, just as there is a standard set of relations between words and their referents, in virtue of which language can give us information about the world. And this is quite false.” (2) 

   Therefore, the question remains, what form does this agreement take? When he examines how we come to know simple ideas, it is clear that Locke’s notion of an idea ‘agreeing’ with something does not entail that it should be an exact copy of it. This is particularly evident with respect to the secondary qualities of objects, i.e., those which are not essential - such as colour and taste - and which are powers in the object to produce ideas of these qualities. Thus, our idea, for example, of whiteness resembles nothing in the object itself although, as Locke writes,

       “The now secondary qualities of bodies would disappear if we could discover the primary ones of their minute parts…. we should see an admirable texture of parts of a certain size or figure” (3)

      Even so, for all we know, there may be a number of configurations of these primary parts which produce the sensation of whiteness in us; hence we cannot know that ‘agreement’ necessitates any standard one-to-one relation. Thus our idea of a quality in an object agrees with the object only in the sense that it tells us that the object is capable of creating the idea of that quality in us which, indeed, does not appear to be a particularly enlightening definition. Even in the case of primary qualities, although said to resemble ideas more closely, it is difficult to envisage what form this resemblance could take, given that the mind or, indeed, an idea, cannot be extended,

“It is most regrettable that he should have given so little attention to the primary qualities, and to our knowledge of them”, (4)

 as R. I. Aaron noted. Thus, Locke appears to say that we can only know that there must be something external which causes our simple ideas because, he believes, the mind could not invent them. This is how our ideas ‘agree’ with things, although the exact manner of this agreement remains unexplained and mysterious.

In his analysis of complex ideas except substances, Locke is able to talk of “a certain and undoubted reality” (5) because such ideas are 

   “combinations of ideas which the mind by its free choice puts together without considering any connections they have a nature” (6)

 From such modes and relations, therefore, the question of agreement or disagreement does not arise, as they are not “referred to the existence of any thing.” (7) This means, for example, that whether a triangle exist or not, it does not affect the reality and validity of, say, Pythagoras’ theorem. However, it is when he comes to consider ideas of substances which have their archetypes without us, that Locke seems most confusing. He states that our ideas of substances are only real if the simple ideas which comprise them have existed in such a form, and we have observed them to do so. His uncertainty and caution on this point is evident in his tentative summing up about substances, where he states that 

       “…our ideas, being thus true, though not perhaps very exact copies, are yet the subjects of real (as far as we have any) knowledge of them: which, as has already showed, will not be found to reach very far, but so far as it does, it will still be real knowledge.” (8)

The difficulty Locke finds here is one of being able to judge when agreement or disagreement is present between an idea and an external archetype: hence his statement that 

     “It is evident that the mind knows not things immediately”, (9) 

is not, indeed, evident and, in fact, paradoxical, because if we do not know things immediately we can have no evidence that we do not know them immediately, as we cannot tell what they are like in any form other than the one in which we experience them. As R. I. Aaron explains more concisely,

     “To know whether the representation is correct or not, one must first see the original”. (10) 

However the objection to Locke’s theory which we are considering asks only how it is that the mind knows ideas agree with things themselves, not how it knows they are correct. Nevertheless, this does not alter the fact that even in accordance with Locke’s own theory of knowledge, any attempt to solve even the lesser of these problems seems impossible, as ideas may be pure and vivid hallucination, caused by our own minds and not external objects.

       An important limitation on what can be known is clearly explained in a section On Knowledge In General, when Locke argues that 

       “knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists. Where this perception is there is knowledge; and where it is not, there, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge. (11)

 Therefore, because 

“we can never look behind the curtain of ideas to observe the physical objects which cause our ideas”,(12)

 our complex ideas, such as mathematical demonstrations cannot be known to apply to anything beyond themselves, and knowledge in terms of a Lockean relation of the agreement, if any, between ideas and things (non-ideas) is apparently impossible. However, many, including Aaron, have pointed to a marked inconsistency in the Essay, because when Locke comes to consider sensation,

     “he does seem to say that we know directly the existence of things in sensation, and that we thus break out beyond ideas. That is to say, Locke is rejecting the view that we know things through ideas only.” (13)

Although sensation is hardly mentioned in the chapter on the On The Reality Of Knowledge (simple ideas are said to be discovered or to operate upon us), we can see grounds for Aaron‘s criticism if we look back to Book 2, where simple ideas are described as

   “…nothing but the effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God, to produce sensations in us, they cannot but be correspondent and adequate to those powers; and we are sure they agree to the reality of things”. (14)

 Elsewhere, Locke writes of "the testimony of my eyes” (15) as “the greatest assurance I can possibly have” (15) and “a certainty as great as human nature is capable of”(15). Hence, it appears to be the case that despite the fact that Locke has carefully analysed the instrument of human understanding, even to the extent of providing a definition of knowledge so that we do not unwittingly transgress its limits, he himself seems to have done so, in being certain of something which should remain incomprehensible - the existence of physical objects beyond our ideas.

                 In defence of Locke, if he was to justify theory of ideas he needed to regard sensation as evidence of existence if he wanted to 

   “escape the familiar charge that, closed within the circle of ideas, he failed to realise both that the claim to existential knowledge must be vacuous, and that it is inconsistent with his definition of knowledge”. (16)

However, strictly speaking, Locke was not inconsistent in this theory of sensation as a way to real knowledge; it is important that the above quotations refer to “assurance” rather than “knowledge”, and Locke is at pains to stress the significant difference these two ideas had for him in Book 4 -

     “There is, indeed, another perception of the mind, employed about the particular existence of finite beings without us; which, going beyond bare probability, and yet not reaching perfectly to either of the foregoing degrees of certainty*, passes under the name of knowledge”. (17) 

Hence, sensation to Locke provides “an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge” (18),

 because, resulting to the ‘safe’ defence of common sense Locke explains that someone who

  “…in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct, plain demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing quickly”. (19)

It is arguable here that Locke was misunderstanding the function of philosophers’ sceptical arguments concerning the existence of external objects - as O’Connor explains,

   “…they are not discussing a question of fact whose answer would affect our behaviour in any way”. (20)

Although a retreat into practical experience might seem to suggest that his theories were not fully developed, A.D. Woozley, believing the Essay to be “the fruit of long, patient and cautious nurture” (21),  suggests that Locke’s philosophy is more subtle than is initially apparent. He emphasises the fact that Locke’s definition of knowledge does not refer to relations between ideas, but instead to relations “of any of our ideas” (22). Perhaps, he suggests, our ideas could agree or disagree with things other than ideas - such as external objects. However, for obvious reasons, such agreements cannot be perceived. Woozley then quotes Locke, who said 

   “Whenever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, there is certain knowledge; and whenever we are sure that these ideas agree with the reality of things, here is certain, real knowledge.” (23)

 Therefore, to know that something exists we have not only to find the agreement between the idea of sensation it produces and the idea that it exists  (which is just a simple relation of ideas); but also, in order to have certain, real knowledge, we have also to be sure that there is an agreement between our idea of sensation and the actual existence of the object. An example that these two types of agreement are apparent in experience is seen in the fact that we do not always believe our eyes - that is, the assurance of existence given by sight can be rejected if our knowledge of existence overrides it (as in, say, a magician’s trick). Nevertheless, such a theory does not really solve what is it at issue here - although sensation may give us assurance of actual existence, perhaps enabling us (in addition to the relation of our ideas) to know really and certainly that our ideas agree with things themselves, this assurance rests on certain assumptions which may be unacceptable. In particular, it does not explain how we can be assured that an idea of sensation agrees with the existence of externally existing objects which, after all is conveyed by sensation, and, perhaps, only just another idea. Surely it agrees with itself, and thus entraps the mind once more within its own ideas.

    In view of Locke’s notions about the mind and the way in which operates, it is perhaps no wonder that he is unconvincing when he tries to show how the minds can know that its ideas agree with things themselves. In his analysis of the Essay, Aaron emphasises three of Locke’s assumptions,

     “first that physical objects exist, that is, he assumes a realism; secondly, that the brain being affected affects the mind, that is, an interactionist theory of the mind-body relation; thirdly, that perception is brought about causally by the action of physical objects on the mind through the brain."(24)

  This indicates the three-tiered nature of Locke’s representative theory - instead of just object and mind (as in naive realism) or sense-data and mind, Locke believes that there are physical objects, ideas, and the mind. This complicates things, because

    “the mind does not see the real physical object. It sees an object which somehow exist in the mind, and yet it is not the mind itself, nor a modification of the mind”. (25)

Locke seems to use ideas as a bridge between unknown things and our minds, but never analyses precisely the relationship minds have to ideas; for example, how it can perceive them directly when it is incapable of perceiving physical objects directly (can the mind ‘see’ ideas in any sense?). Ultimately, his theory raises the familiar problems of a dualist interpretation of the nature of mind, and hence his arguments are difficult to accept if such notions are not assumed. S. Alexander suggest that the best approach is

           “…to deny the existence of ideas as copies of things, and… recognise that we can directly apprehend things themselves”(26),

 and, indeed, Aaron saw Locke’s theory of ideas as being anyway of secondary importance to his philosophy. He suggests that it was just used as a vehicle to convey an argument of more central importance - that is, that all our experience is gained from sensation and reflection, and he only modified the accepted notions of perception and mind that were available in his day. Hence, Aaron explains,

     “Locke thought then that some sort of representationalism and dualism was inevitable”. (27)

      In order to decide how the mind can know that its ideas agree with things themselves, even S. Alexander‘s criticism, that Locke’s "separation of ideas in general from things with needless” (28), is not very helpful, as the relation of ideas/things to mind would remain unsolved. Because this relationship seems to be the main difficulty, it would perhaps be more illuminating to unite the mind and ideas. It is, indeed, a small step from saying ideas are in the mind to speaking of ideas as the mind (since they obviously comprise it). This immediately renders the link between mind and objects more direct. Nevertheless, in fairness to Locke, the difficulty expressed about the question of perception still poses an enigma now, and given the fact that the mind-body controversy remains ‘unsolved’, we can hardly blame him for his uneasiness. He was attempting to understand a complex problem which involves repercussions beyond what was, by Locke’s own definition, comprehensible, and so only succeeded in exposing the defects of a theory less sophisticated than the difficulty demanded, and revealing assumptions which perhaps cause a modern reader to feel more than uneasy. In recognising such objections as those at the beginning of Book 4, chapter 4 we could at least say he emphasises what is an important philosophical issue.

* That is, intuitive and demonstrative knowledge.

(To be continued shortly...!)